Add to ORKGWe present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These conditions involve not only complementarity in types of the total payoff to a match, as in the transferable utility case, but also monotonicity in type of the degree of transferability between part-ners. We apply our conditions to study some models of risk sharing and incentive problems, deriving new results for predicted matching patterns in those contexts
We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about ind...
We consider the problem of assigning sellers and buyers into stable matches in a market for differen...
This paper modifies and extends the aggregate equilibrium models for matching markets developed earl...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environ-ments where utility is not fully t...
Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching...
Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching...
We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (malesand females) ca...
We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfec...
This paper studies the effect of limited commitment on sorting when two sides of a frictionless mark...
We study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections, providing s...
ABSTRACT: Recently, Jouini et al. (2005) studied the problem of optimal sharing of aggregate risks b...
In Becker’s (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortative if types a...
This paper analyses conditions on agents' preferences for a unique stable matching in models of two-...
We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about ind...
We consider the problem of assigning sellers and buyers into stable matches in a market for differen...
This paper modifies and extends the aggregate equilibrium models for matching markets developed earl...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environ-ments where utility is not fully t...
Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching...
Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching...
We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (malesand females) ca...
We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfec...
This paper studies the effect of limited commitment on sorting when two sides of a frictionless mark...
We study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections, providing s...
ABSTRACT: Recently, Jouini et al. (2005) studied the problem of optimal sharing of aggregate risks b...
In Becker’s (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortative if types a...
This paper analyses conditions on agents' preferences for a unique stable matching in models of two-...
We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about ind...
We consider the problem of assigning sellers and buyers into stable matches in a market for differen...
This paper modifies and extends the aggregate equilibrium models for matching markets developed earl...